Cancer treatment is often carried out within protocol-based clinical trials. An oncology clinic may take part in many trials each of which requires data to be collected for monitoring efficacy and toxicity of treatment. Subsequently, this data is analysed statistically to evaluate clinical objectives of the trial. To be scientifically valid, such analysis must be based on data that is both complete and correct. This is one motivating factor for introducing computer support for trial management. Further motivation is provided by concern that treatment is consistent with the protocol and the well-being of the patient. The complexity of many protocols, the life-threatening nature of cancer and the toxicity of treatment side-effects emphasise the safety-critical nature of oncology. The OaSiS system provides decision support for the protocol-based treatment of cancer patients with emphasis on the safety aspects of the advice it gives. It offers a highly graphical interface, employs integrity constraint checking techniques from logic databases to monitor compliance with a protocol and is implemented in PROLOG. The paper describes the main features of OaSiS and indicates work in progress and planned.
INTRODUCTION
OaSiS is a decision support system for the management of cancer patients based on the written protocols which govern clinical trials of therapies. Such computer support is necessary because the protocols are complex and there is a need for complete and correct accumulation of clinical data before scientifically valid statistical analysis can be carried out. This paper focuses on the current functionality of OaSiS and discusses the use of safety related knowledge identified from an extensive study of oncology protocols and from discussions with clinicians, pharmacists and medical informaticians. The safety critical nature of the domain imposes requirements on software designers and implementers to ensure that the translation from paper to computerised protocol is completed thoroughly and correctly [9] . OaSiS has been implemented within RED, a project funded by the UK DTI and SERC "Safety Critical Systems" research programme.
A major influence on OaSiS is the work at Stanford University on the ONCOCIN [32] , EON [26] and OPAL [25] family of computer systems. In the OaSiS prototype, this is particularly evident in the user interface and its combined use of graphical, form-based and spread-sheet like windows to present and manipulate clinical data. A second influence is that of ICRF's own work arising from the BOSS and DILEMMA projects which have affected the underlying protocol model, decision-making procedures and functionality. More specialised systems have been produced for radiotherapy planning [16, 27] ; for breast cancer [10, 20] ; for ovarian cancer [21] and for head and neck cancer [23] . The main differences between the work on OaSiS and that of other projects on cancer management systems is the emphasis on safety issues and the use of analysis and implementation methods based on logic based techniques.
Before illustrating what OaSiS can offer to a clinical user, we provide some background to the domain and explain in more detail why such software is necessary and potentially beneficial. The final section of the paper describes plans for future improvements.
Protocol-based Treatment in Cancer Trials
Variation in tumour behaviour and the variety of cancer therapies inhibit the selection of optimal treatments of many cancers. Instead, patients are entered in clinical trials involving combinations of surgery, hormone therapy, radiotherapy and chemotherapy with the aim of evaluating efficacy and safety. Clinical trials are governed by procedures, or protocols, which detail how they should be planned. A wide range of issues is presented in protocols which are detailed, complex documents. However, there is a common structure to the organisation of many cancer trials and those tasks amenable to computerisation are listed in figure 1. eligibility randomisation/trial registration pre-treatment investigations treatment planning (chemo-, hormone, radio-therapy; surgery) monitoring response of disease (typically tumour size and incidence) monitoring response of patient (typically side-effects) modification of disease treatment as a result of the monitoring treatment of side-effects treatment follow-up and end-points
FIGURE 1. Tasks common to cancer trials and amenable to computerisation
Clinical trials typically have a number of "arms" specifying chemotherapies and other treatments to which patients are randomly assigned for subsequent comparison and for evaluation of trial objectives. Indeed, most protocols begin with an explicit statement of such objectives (figure 2).
(i) To determine whether treatment with the intensive regimen BOP/VIP-B is more effective than treatment with BEP/EP in the management of patients with poor prognosis metastatic teratoma with respect to complete response rate, progression-free and overall survival.
(ii) To determine the effect of r-metHug-CSF on the proportion of patients receiving full dose intensity of combination chemotherapy with either BOP/VIP-B or BEP/EP.
FIGURE 2:
Objectives of protocol TE13 [24] . The trial depicted [24] has four randomisation arms, each comprising different sequences of combinations of chemotherapeutic drugs. At the next level of detail, figure 3 illustrates the complexity of planning this particular chemotherapy. Drugs are given singly or in combination on particular days of cycles. 
The need for computer support in oncology
A written protocol can be between 20 and 60 pages in length and a major oncology clinic may use as many as 60 protocols concurrently [32] . The amount of clinical data collected (figure 5) and the complexity of some protocols call for computerised management of the patient's clinical details, the clinician's diagnosis, the treatment plan and the subsequent treatment modifications arising from therapeutic effects and toxic side-effects. [3] Patients do not always receive therapy in precisely the manner advocated by the protocol and data needed for formal analysis of treatment results are not always completely and accurately collected [32] . Inadequately collected data has invalidated a number of largescale clinical trials 4 . Therefore, potential benefits of the use of decision support software are improved compliance with the protocol and improved data collection [17, 19] . With more accurate and more complete data, the statistical evaluation of trial objectives can be more effective with concomitant improvements in medical knowledge and in the treatment of patients.
The safety critical nature of decision support in oncology
Common side-effects of chemotherapy include bone marrow suppression and damage to the gastrointestinal mucosa. Bone marrow suppression lowers white cell count and makes a patient susceptible to serious infections. If the platelet count is low then severe bleeding may occur. Mucositis is unpleasant, causes severe weight loss and dehydration and provides a route for infection. Some unusual drug side-effects cause severe lung and heart problems. Thus, there is a narrow therapeutic window between giving sufficient drug for optimal anti-tumour effects and for life-threatening toxicity. Therefore, protocol guidelines for dose adjustment must be followed if the patient's life is not to be put at risk. Adverse toxic events are often presented in a protocol as a table of hazards, means for their detection and possible ameliorating actions (see table 1 below).
Some users of an oncology decision support system will be sufficiently expert to detect inaccuracies and potentially hazardous advice before it is acted upon. Less experienced junior doctors may fail to spot incorrect advice simply because they are unfamiliar with the protocol or the drug side-effects. Whether it is to avoid losing the confidence of experienced oncologists or to avoid unsafe recommendations being acted upon, extreme care must be taken to ensure that the transition from paper protocol to computerisation through abstract representation is as complete and correct as is possible. It is essential, therefore, that safety issues are thoroughly investigated before detailed software design 4 The variation in quality control of data capture in multi-centre trials has been of particular concern [34] .
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and implementation begins. Preliminary results of our work on safety aspects of OaSiS are reported in detail elsewhere [13] . 
THE OASIS SOFTWARE

Background and overview
Following a study of ICRF's previous and existing projects on decision support systems in oncology [11, 29] and similar activities at Stanford University [19, 32] , the development of OaSiS began in late 1992/early 1993. Primarily, the prototype has been produced as a demonstrator to oncologists with a view to recruiting their active contribution to the future design and implementation of a fully fledged system. In addition, the safety-critical nature of decision support in oncology could not be identified fully without clinical participation. Secondary aims have been to test methodological approaches to the associated decision-making and to their implementation in PROLOG on available hardware. A further aim has been to experiment with the user interface which needs to be highly graphical given the nature of the clinical data. The collaborating oncology clinic at the Churchill Hospital in Oxford uses Macintosh computers and so
MacPROLOG [22] , with its built-in facilities for dialogue and graphics management, was an obvious programming environment to select.
Currently, OaSiS has 7 major components as indicated in figure 6. Should the user try to override these calculations by making some alteration then safety constraints are brought to bear in a style typical of logic databases. In subsequent sections of the paper, we illustrate how the clinician uses OaSiS to generate treatment recommendations and how alterations or suggestions by the user are checked for compliance with the computerised protocol. This will involve descriptions of patient eligibility criteria for trial entry, the user interface, some components of the knowledge base and the animation of the underlying protocol itself.
The representation of eligibility criteria
Eligibility criteria for clinical trial entry are typically represented as a collection of including and excluding conditions. Protocol TE09 [14] , for example, has eligibility criteria: Eligibility is considered on a particular day, and so a straightforward representation 5 begins with: The declaration askable(Predicate) means that all information regarding Predicate is to be obtained from the user (or an external source) in the Query-the-User fashion [30] .
The representation of eligibility criteria also illustrates the current use in OaSiS of a temporal argument for those predicates involving time. This simplistic approach (which works reasonably well, it should be said) is being replaced in RED by an interval-valued temporal logic [5] . Protocols often include temporal references to treatments, particularly chemo-and hormone therapies, in a relative fashion in terms of cycles of treatment.
Thus, it is necessary to have both relative and absolute descriptions of time points, with the former being used for drug calculation rules (see section 2.5) and the latter for eligibility, patient records and visit scheduling.
The user interface
The graphical user interface (figure 7) handles all interaction with the user through the manipulation of iconic, form and tabular based presentations of clinical data. All interactions are viewed either as data entry or query invocation. A graphics window (e.g., MASS/X-RAY POSITIONS in figure 7 ) is used for entering and presenting tumour incidence in an iconic format. Forms (eg PATIENT DATA) are generated from a form description language and are typically used to present and enter administrative data.
Data that is tied to dates of clinic visits (see VISIT window) is presented spread-sheet 5 Throughout the paper, we use the convention that strings beginning with an upper case letter denote variables.
8 style in a tabular format (examples include HAEM for blood test results and CHEMO for calculated drug dosages).
FIGURE 7. The OaSiS user interface for trial management
So as not to overwhelm a user with too much data, each window can be toggled to a closed state (by clicking on its label) whereby it is presented as a slim, labelled, horizontal band (for example MASS/X-RAY and OTHER-TREAT). These spread-sheet like windows have been implemented using lower level primitives since MacPROLOG does not support them directly.
The knowledge base and problem solving in OaSiS
A major part of the knowledge base deals with aspects of cancer management which are independent of particular protocols. Individual modules contain protocol specific knowledge for particular types of cancer as well as a small subcomponent describing the forms and "spreadsheets" for configuring the general user interface for that protocol. A third component contains drug information extracted from the protocols studied,
supplemented by standard texts [1, 2, 8] .
OaSiS can be thought of as a kind of "expert system shell" restricted to the domain of oncology. It can be used with any protocol provided the following details are provided: 
Administration of therapies at clinic visits
Treatment is usually co-ordinated through clinic visits as indicated in a separate window 'VISIT' in the OaSiS interface (figure 7). By pressing the 'Next visit' button a new visit date can be generated according to the schedule specified in the protocol. A mouse click on a new date causes a summary of the purpose of the visit to be generated (figure 10). In other circumstances it needs to be reduced by 25%: The results of these dose calculations are presented automatically to the user in the CHEMO spread-sheet style window. In Figure 11 , we can see the result of applying these rules to the calculation of the latest modified dosage for the drug etoposide where the default value of 240 has been modified to 180 because of the results of blood tests shown in the HAEM spreadsheet:
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11 FIGURE 11. Dose modification of etoposide (240 to 180) on 22/10/92 due to toxicity. 
Negotiating a safe treatment
OaSiS suggests treatments and their modification according to accepted clinical practice and the protocol governing the trial under which the patient is being treated. If the clinician disagrees then it must be possible to suggest an alternative. Of course, checks on such modifications will be made. The clinician may also need to record additional treatments, for example for illnesses unrelated to the malignancy or for side-effects. The proposed medication should obviously be validated against known contraindications, especially those specified in the protocol.
Next, we illustrate two of the safety principles mentioned earlier which have been extracted following an intensive study of many oncology protocols. An instance of the first safety rule is the following:
Ex R5 Nephrotoxic antibiotics such as Gentamycin should be avoided during the Cisplatin infusion. [3] which is quoted verbatim as it appears in the protocol. Similar examples occur in many oncology protocols. Underlying them is a general principle that actions outside the recommended treatment plan are barred if they are likely to exacerbate an existing hazard arising from the treatment itself. It is such general principles that analysis of protocols has identified and which we seek to represent in OaSiS, in as general a fashion as possible.
Informally, the principle underlying Ex R5 can be expressed as: The actual formulation (as an integrity constraint) will be shown in a moment. The specific information contained in Ex R5 is represented as a set of facts (some of which are implicit in its original formulation) to be used in conjunction with principle (R5), thus:
produces_effect(administration_of(cisplatin), impaired_renal_function). hazardous(impaired_renal_function). aggravates(administration_of(gentamycin), impaired_renal_function).
These safety restrictions are employed in OaSiS in two main ways: to generate a warning message immediately certain users consult OaSiS, and as integrity constraints to check any additional prescriptions that might be made during the actual consultation itself.
A second example of safety knowledge concerns the barring of actions that reduce efficacy of treatment. We have been able to formulate a general rule which, informally, can be stated as follows: Two instances of its use come from a trial involving the drug Interferon-a2α for the treatment of colorectal cancer [31] :
Ex R6a Aspirin may reduce the efficacy of interferon-a2α. Therefore, aspirin will not be used. Indomethacin does not have this effect.
Ex R6b Corticosteroids may reduce the efficacy of interferon-a2α and should not be prescribed for side-effects.
These specific instances are again represented as facts to be used in conjunction with (R6):
reduces_efficacy(administration_of(aspirin), administration_of(interferonα)). reduces_efficacy(administration_of(corticosteroids), administration_of(interferonα)).
Rules such as (R5) and (R6), shown informally above, are represented as integrity constraints on the database recording the negotiated treatment plan, in the usual logic database style (see, e.g., [12] ). For illustration, rules (R5) and (R6) are represented as follows:
(ICR5) invalid(user_suggestion(perform(Action1), Plan) ) ← part_of(Action2, Plan) and produces_effect(Action2, Effect) and hazardous(Effect) and aggravates(Action1, Effect) and is_avoidable(Action1, Plan).
(ICR6) invalid(user_suggestion(perform(Action1), Plan) ) ← part_of(Action2, Plan) and reduces_efficacy(Action1, Action2) and is_avoidable(Action1, Plan).
Although it is usual to write integrity constraints in the form of denials, we find it more convenient to employ the form shown above. The reason is simply that all conditions except for user_suggestion are static, in the sense that they are stored in parts of the OaSiS system which the user does not modify during a consultation with the system.
Here invalid can be read as an alternative symbol to ¬ for (standard, truth-functional) negation. It also has an operational meaning, to signal that in the case of violation of the constraint it is this condition -i.e., the attempted input -which is to be rejected. Any integrity constraints that are violated can be presented in the form of a critique of the user's action as arguments for and against (see fig 13) . Here the user has requested assistance with treating a fever and has then asked for an explanation as to why gentamycin is contraindicated. The argument against is generated from (ICR5).
We have illustrated only two of the half a dozen or so generic safety rules we have found [13] . The others are concerned with avoidance of hazardous side-effects by applying suitable prophylactic treatments; warnings about incorrectly performed treatments;
recommendations to perform adequate monitoring of side-effects and actions to ameliorate toxic effects as soon as they have been observed. 
WORK IN PROGRESS AND PLANNED
Improvements to the user interface and graphical representation of data
Graphical presentation and entry of data is likely to be of considerable benefit to clinical users. With a suitable internal model of simple human anatomy, multiple views of 14 tumour incidence should be displayed as well as more rapid or transient presentations of associated quantitative data. Alternatively, tumour incidence/dimensions could be presented graphically alongside haematological data or chemotherapy and indexed by clinic visit so that treatment progress can be rapidly reviewed. Graphical overviews of important clinical events are more usefully presented in terms of time lines with clear separation of treatment in the past, present and that planned for future clinic visits. Later, we shall also be considering the production of aids for clinicians to define their own protocols for in-house use and employing a graphical interface along the lines of the OPAL protocol editor implemented at Stanford University [25] .
Representational formalism and the treatment of obligations
Further development of the representational formalism includes refinement of the temporal aspects; as identified earlier, these are currently done by explicit time-stamping.
We are currently re-implementing the temporal behaviour of OaSiS in terms of an interval-valued temporal logic developed within the RED project [5] . This is intended to cover all areas where time needs to be explicitly manipulated:
scheduling of high level protocol activities and tasks in general monitoring of toxicity and modifiable treatment planning evaluation of treatment response criteria and planning of treatment follow-up
For the purposes of this paper, however, we wish to focus on the developments concerning the representation of safety and other constraints, especially as regards the treatment of notions of obligation that arise.
Although the current design of OaSiS separates constraints into two categories -data integrity constraints and those dealing with safety knowledge -the same treatment is given to both. They use the same underlying logic and generate the same behaviours;
only the form of messages to the user differs.
We believe it is important to make finer distinctions according to the nature of the constraints to be supported in such systems, in particular, in order to deal more explicitly with the tension between compliance with the protocol and the need to allow clinicians some degree of flexibility or discretion. This tension is characteristic of any system where agents' behaviours and interactions are regulated by norms which specify how those agents ought to behave and how they are permitted to behave, whilst leaving open the possibility that actual behaviour may deviate from what is prescribed. The formal tool associated with the characterisation of such systems is deontic logic: for further development of OaSiS we will distinguish between database constraints that cannot be violated and a class of 'softer' deontic constraints whose violation can be tolerated. The application of deontic logic to integrity constraints in databases has been discussed in the 15 literature (see [4, 15, 18, 36] ) though proposals vary in scope and emphasis, and the techniques remain comparatively undeveloped; OaSiS provides an excellent example to drive these developments in a practical setting. The explicit representation of notions of obligation in safety-critical systems has also been addressed within the RED project [6, 9] .
Although deontic logic is ordinarily described as the logic of obligation and permission, it can be misleading to rely on this description. The reason is simply that words such as 'obligatory', 'must', 'should' can have a variety of meanings. In [15] it is suggested that for the purpose of identifying practical applications, deontic logic is better regarded as the logic which deals with the distinction between what ought ideally to be the case on the one hand, and what actually is the case on the other.
Where a (safety) constraint is such that non-compliance is potentially life-threatening, it is represented appropriately by a standard 'hard' integrity constraint which allows no violation. Consider, for instance, the safety constraint
If anaphylaxis (severe allergic reaction) occurs, Cisplatin must be stopped [24] .
The 'must' is here adequately represented as the form of necessity already provided by the standard, 'hard' integrity constraint.
Obviously the possibility exists that such a constraint can be violated in the real world.
One can easily imagine circumstances in which a clinician continues to administer a drug even though this should not, or must not, be done according to the protocol. However, in the context of the OaSiS application, the question is not whether such violations of constraints can occur in the real world, but whether we want to allow the possibility of violation into the database. Where safety constraints are represented as standard 'hard' database constraints the OaSiS system will not accept any attempt to input data which contravenes them, by the standard integrity checking mechanisms. Such a representation effectively builds compliance with safety constraints into the system (cf. the discussion of 'regimentation' in [15] ). Of course, this mechanism does not guarantee compliance with safety constraints, because the actual behaviour of clinicians is outside the control of the system -it is possible that a clinician could enter one thing into the database but actually do something different. But subject to the assumption that clinicians act in good faith and allow themselves to be guided by the system, compliance with the safety constraint is guaranteed in a sense. And surely this is a realistic assumption, especially since attempted contraventions of safety constraints are accompanied in OaSiS by indications of the consequences of breach.
Compare now the next two examples, both taken from a protocol dealing with the treatment of testicular cancer [3] :
Nephrotoxic antibiotics such as Gentamycin should be avoided during the Cisplatin infusion.
The Bleomycin-Cyclophosphamide-Dactinomycin regimen will produce myelosuppression and it is essential to have a nadir count between days 7 and 12 and to warn the patient to report symptoms of infection or bleeding ...
We understand that for the first of these some degree of discretion would be desirable in practice. There are conceivable circumstances in which a clinician might choose to contravene this guideline and the system should then allow such non-prescribed treatments to be recorded. This constraint is appropriately represented as a deontic integrity constraint. In the second example, we are unsure about the status of 'essential'; this would need to be checked with a clinical oncologist and the constraint represented as a 'hard' or 'soft' integrity constraint accordingly.
Informally, the operational behaviour and the implementation of the deontic constraints (of the kind sketched here) is straightforward. Attempted violations are detected in identical fashion to standard integrity constraints; a warning message is displayed to the user, but freedom to over-ride the recommendation is available, subject to satisfaction of other constraints. In practice it will usually be necessary to maintain an audit trail so that treatment which deviates from the protocol can be monitored and subjected to later analysis, but this feature can be provided without difficulty.
The point of introducing a special deontic-logical component into the representation formalism is not just that it provides a cleaner conceptual framework for the constraints arising in the application. The interactions between constraints, safety and other, can be quite complex in practice, and it becomes more and more difficult to keep track of these interactions as the set of constraints in a given application grows. It is obviously desirable to check for consistency among constraints, to simplify them if possible, and generally to subject them to other meaning-preserving transformations, independently of their application to a specific database. For instance, it seems clear that the sets of 'hard' and 'soft' integrity constraints should both be internally consistent, but it is also necessary to ensure that the two sets do not conflict: if there is a 'hard' constraint requiring that A must be in the database, then there should be no 'soft' constraint requiring that A should not be in the database; any set of constraints not satisfying this property would ordinarily be regarded as ill-formed at least. This property is an instance of the kind of 'ought implies can' principle common in the formulation of many deontic logics.
There are good reasons to think that a simple form of deontic logic will prove adequate for dealing with the type of constraints encountered in OaSiS, although this statement is still subject to some investigation. In particular, once 'soft' constraints and the possibility of violations are admitted, then it is natural to consider what other constraints come into effect in those circumstances. The proper formalisation of 'contrary-to-duty structures' -roughly, the situation where there is a primary obligation and a secondary obligation which comes into effect when the primary obligation is violated -has proved notoriously elusive and is the subject of much current research in the field of deontic logic. (See [28] for further discussion and references to the standard works in the deontic logic literature; this paper also makes some comparisons between contrary-to-duty and the more familiar exception structures studied in default and non-monotonic reasoning.) It remains to be seen to what extent contrary-to-duty constraints need to be treated in the OaSiS applications.
We have motivated the use of deontic constraints by reference to safety constraints, but we do not want to give the impression that deontic constraints are applicable only to the representation of safety knowledge. Deontic logic can also be applied -less commonly and less urgently perhaps -to what we have called data integrity in this paper. In this respect we disagree with the position expressed in [36] where it is proposed that database constraints can be classified (roughly) according to whether they correspond to statements which can be violated in the real world or to truths of the real world, which cannot be violated. Much of the discussion of this section has been concerned with indicating that norms which can be violated in the real world are often appropriately represented in a database by 'hard' integrity constraints which cannot be violated; and, conversely, we are in agreement with, e.g. [4] , who point out that truths of the real world need not always be represented as necessary ('hard') constraints on a database since we may allow, for instance, that our representation is incomplete.
It may also be desirable to pick out other categories of constraints, such as those concerned with ensuring the scientific validity of the data collected during the course of treatment. We mean by this that some constraints are included in protocols, not because contravention would constitute a life-threatening hazard or affect the efficacy of treatment, but because it would compromise the intended contribution to the objectives of the clinical trial being conducted. We can make a case then for three categories of constraints -for data integrity, for safety knowledge, for ensuring scientific validity of trial results; within each category, any given constraint would be represented either as a hard or a soft database constraint according to the nature of the necessity -or the 'strength' of the constraint -to be represented.
Consideration of clinical trial recruitment
It is theoretically possible for OaSiS to be used to screen clinical databases for patients who might be eligible for entry into particular trials. With completely automated screening, situations would arise where patients fail criteria even though satisfaction could be ensured if small changes to existing treatment or if delays in consideration of trial entry could be made. For example, a patient may be receiving a drug for a non-18 malignant condition that is explicitly contraindicated in the trial protocol. There may be an alternative treatment that is not contraindicated or it might be possible to delay consideration of trial entry until the non-malignant condition has cleared up -provided the clinical judgement is that such a delay is consistent with the patient's best interests.
Similarly, there will often be a lack of up to date haematological or biochemical data needed for eligibility consideration. In some situations it might be possible to reason about the persistence of previously obtained data and estimate the likelihood that the patient could be eligible and that such considerations need to be pursued further.
In some medical domains, such as in trials of new drugs in AIDS therapy, successful trial recruitment is very important. The Stanford group have recently been applying statistical and related techniques to the consideration of trial recruitment for this very reason in a project called T-Helper [33] , a follow-on activity from work on the ONCOCIN system.
We shall investigate the same problem but armed with different tools of analysis which exploit more obviously symbolic approaches to identify the qualifications [35, 37] necessary for eligibility. This approach can be viewed as the generation of incomplete arguments which need to be "repaired" and subsequently structured in some framework of logical uncertainty [7] so that eligibility can be suitably qualified.
